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A COMBATIVE DISEASE: THE EBOLA 
EPIDEMIC IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
ALISON AGNEW* 
Abstract: In early 2014, a devastating epidemic of Ebola broke out across Guin-
ea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, which then spread to other countries and led to the 
deaths of more than 11,000 people. In response, the affected countries declared 
states of emergency, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the epidem-
ic to be a public health emergency of international concern, and the United Na-
tions (UN) determined the epidemic was a threat to international peace and secu-
rity. Though these actions helped confront the spread of Ebola, the WHO’s and 
UN’s responses were too slow and too inefficient to effectively combat the dis-
ease. To end this epidemic and to address future epidemics, the WHO and UN 
must be strengthened with more robust enforcement capabilities and increased 
funding. Further, the international community must recognize that Ebola is as 
much a threat to international peace and security as an act of war. Thus, states 
should react to disease outbreaks just as they would react to an act of war by uti-
lizing the principle of self-defense pursuant to Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter.  
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in March 2014, an outbreak of Ebola ripped through West Af-
rica, spreading quickly from rural villages to urban centers and across the 
globe.1 Though the outbreak began in Guinea, it travelled rapidly to Liberia 
and Sierra Leone.2 Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone were the African states 
most severely affected—in part because they have weak health systems, lack 
human capital and infrastructure, and only recently emerged from long periods 
of instability.3 To assist the affected states, volunteers and healthcare workers 
from other countries provided manpower and resources to help contain the dis-
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 1 See Sarah Roache et al., Lessons from the West African Ebola Epidemic: Towards a Legacy of 
Strong Health Systems, O’NEILL INST. BRIEFING PAPER NO. 10, at 2–4 (Oct. 2, 2014), http://www.
law.georgetown.edu/oneillinstitute/resources/documents/Briefing10Ebola2inTemplate.pdf [http://
perma.cc/HE8Q-YTP6]; WHO Fact Sheet No. 103: Ebola Virus Disease, WHO (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs103/en/ [http://perma.cc/Z94G-QGTP] [hereinafter 
WHO Fact Sheet No. 103]. 
 2 See Roache et al., supra note 1, at 2–3; WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. 
 3 See WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. 
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ease.4 As a result, a few cases of Ebola spread to countries outside of Africa, 
including the United States, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain.5 
Although other states and international organizations observed the grow-
ing epidemic, many were slow to respond with assistance.6 On August 8, 2014, 
approximately five months after the outbreak began, the World Health Organi-
zation (WHO) declared the epidemic to be a “public health emergency of in-
ternational concern” and released its first roadmap to respond to the crisis.7 
The United Nations (UN) also took broad steps to combat the outbreak.8 In 
September 2014, the UN Security Council (UNSC) passed a Resolution calling 
on UN member states to provide assistance, urging the WHO to accelerate its 
response, and encouraging Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to expedite the 
establishment of health systems that would better respond to such diseases.9 
The UNSC determined that the Ebola epidemic is a threat to international 
peace and security, and the UN created a new mission to tackle the crisis.10 
Though the WHO and UN have taken many positive steps to combat the Ebola 
outbreak, these responses have not been sufficient to contain the epidemic.11 
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on the Ebo-
la virus disease, the ongoing Ebola epidemic in West Africa that began in 2014, 
and the legal mechanisms available to the WHO and UN in this situation. Part 
II explores the domestic responses of the three states most affected by the epi-
demic, the responses of the WHO and UN, and several shortcomings of these 
reactions. Part III argues that the WHO’s legal solutions need to be bolstered 
with stronger enforcement capabilities and greater funding to address this and 
future disease epidemics. Moreover, Part III contends that states should be 
                                                                                                                           
 4 See Lauren Z. Asher, Note, Confronting Disease in a Global Arena, 9 CARDOZO J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 135, 142 (2001); Roache et al., supra note 1, at 3–6. 
 5 See Ebola Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 24, 2015), http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/11/health/ebola-fast-
facts/ [http://perma.cc/VV5Z-GQMG]; Ebola Situation Report, WHO (Nov. 11, 2015), http://apps.who.
int/ebola/current-situation/ebola-situation-report-11-november-2015 [http://perma.cc/V5GN-4ZDA]. 
 6 See Roache et al., supra note 1, at 5–6. 
 7 Statement on the 1st Meeting of the International Health Regulations (IHR) Emergency Com-
mittee on the 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WHO (Aug. 8, 2014), http://www.who.int/media
centre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/ [http://perma.cc/5HDY-PWY8] [hereinafter State-
ment on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee]; see Ebola Response Roadmap, WHO 
(Aug. 28, 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/131596/1/EbolaResponseRoadmap.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/67PW-WBVG] [hereinafter Ebola Response Roadmap] (coordinating implementation 
of response efforts). 
 8 See G.A. Res. 69/1, ¶¶ 1, 3 (Sept. 19, 2014); S.C. Res. 2177, pmbl. (Sept. 18, 2014). 
 9 See S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 8, pmbl., ¶ 1. 
 10 See G.A. Res. 69/1, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1, 3; S.C. Res. 2177, supra note 8, pmbl. 
 11 See Lena H. Sun et al., Out of Control: How the World’s Health Organizations Failed to Stop 
the Ebola Disaster, WASH. POST (Oct. 4, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/
2014/10/04/how-ebola-sped-out-of-control/ [http://perma.cc/6QD6-M3SX]; Roache et al., supra note 
1, at 8–10. Although the number of active Ebola cases in the affected states has decreased dramatical-
ly since March 2014, new cases are still being intermittently reported. See Ebola Situation Report, 
supra note 5; WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. 
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permitted to act quickly and zealously under the authority of the UNSC and 
general principles of self-defense. A disease is as much a threat to international 
peace and security as an act of aggression, so the international community 
should treat it as one. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. The Ebola Virus Disease 
Ebola virus disease, or Ebola hemorrhagic fever, first appeared in 1976 
during two outbreaks in remote villages in the Sudan and the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo.12 Ebola is a severe disease that is transmitted from the 
organs and bodily fluids of wild animals to humans.13 It spreads between hu-
mans through direct contact with the bodily fluids of an infected person or 
through direct contact with surfaces or materials contaminated with these bodi-
ly fluids.14 Though moderately contagious, Ebola is highly infectious because 
a very small amount of the virus can cause illness.15 Humans are not infectious 
until they develop symptoms, which can take up to twenty-one days and can 
include fever, vomiting, diarrhea, and hemorrhaging.16 The average fatality 
rate for Ebola cases is approximately 50%, and no licensed vaccines are cur-
rently available.17 Isolating and treating infected persons in even rudimentary 
treatment centers and tracing an infected person’s contact with others can 
greatly reduce the spread of disease.18 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Sylvain Baize et al., Emergence of Zaire Ebola Virus in Guinea, 371(15) NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1418, 1418 (2014); WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. Since 1976, there have been twenty-eight 
outbreaks of Ebola in Africa. WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. Earlier major outbreaks oc-
curred in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, and Uganda. Id.; see also David P. Fidler et 
al., Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases: Challenges for International, National, and State 
Law, 31 INT’L LAW. 773, 778 (1997) [hereinafter Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging Infectious 
Diseases] (describing 1995 outbreak of Ebola in Democratic Republic of the Congo and its successful 
local containment). 
 13 See WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. Ebola is often spread to humans from infected 
animals such as chimpanzees, gorillas, monkeys, fruit bats, antelope, and porcupines. See id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See Ebola Fast Facts, supra note 5. 
 16 See WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. 
 17 See id. Two vaccines are currently undergoing testing for human safety, and one experimental 
vaccine tested in Guinea is expected to be highly effective. See id.; Ebola: UN Emergency Response 
Mission Winds Down as WHO Announces ‘Game Changer’ Vaccine, UN NEWS CENTRE (July 31, 
2015), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=51543#.Ve8Z0HsmZKp [http://perma.cc/
TJZ7-37M7] [hereinafter UN Emergency Response Mission Winds Down]; see also Editorial, An Ebo-
la Vaccine: First Results and Promising Opportunities, 386 LANCET 830, 830 (2015), available at 
http://thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-6736%2815%2961177-1.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/5L8Z-2EQ9 ] (describing results of randomized trial of vaccine in Guinea). 
 18 See Editorial, What Worked in Controlling the Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/what-worked-in-controlling-the-ebola-
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Ebola frequently is spread within communities from infected people to 
healthcare workers or from an infected person to family members through tra-
ditional burial ceremonies.19 In traditional burial ceremonies, family members 
and mourners often come into direct contact with the body of the deceased as 
they cleanse and prepare the body for burial, which can transmit Ebola from 
the infected person to the mourners.20 Healthcare workers may become infect-
ed when they come into close contact with patients without personal protection 
or without utilizing proper infection control mechanisms.21 
B. The Current Ebola Epidemic in West Africa 
The current outbreak of Ebola is the longest, “largest[,] and most com-
plex” outbreak of the disease ever, with “more cases and deaths in this out-
break than all others combined.”22 This is at least partially because Ebola 
spread quickly across three contiguous states that did not have prior experience 
with Ebola and lacked adequate healthcare infrastructure and workers.23 As of 
November 11, 2015, there have been 28,635 cases of Ebola and 11,314 deaths 
globally, representing a fatality rate of approximately 40%.24 
The first patient suspected of contracting Ebola in the current epidemic 
was a two-year-old in Guinea who died in December 2013.25 The child’s fami-
ly members then contracted Ebola via contact with the deceased during the 
burial ceremony, and mourners carried the disease to nearby villages.26 A 
health worker from the region where the first case arose also spread the disease 
                                                                                                                           
outbreak-in-west-africa/2015/01/30/7a0cfd10-a643-11e4-a06b-9df2002b86a0_story.html [http://
perma.cc/UR4F-EXY2]. 
 19 See id.; Roache et al., supra note 1, at 3–4; WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. 
 20 See Abby Ohlheiser, People Are Struggling to Bury the Ebola Dead. Here’s Why, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/world/wp/2014/08/07/people-are-struggling-to-
bury-the-ebola-dead-heres-why/ [http://perma.cc/KN3H-YHVX]; Roache et al., supra note 1, at 4; 
WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. Ebola is most contagious when a person has just died because 
the virus has overtaken the entire body. See Ohlheiser, supra. The Ebola virus may remain infectious 
on a dead body for up to a week and is detectable for up to ten weeks. Alexandra Sifferlin, Ebola 
Bodies Are Infectious a Week After Death, Study Shows, TIME (Feb. 13, 2015), available at 
http://time.com/3708994/ebola-bodies-infectious/ [http://perma.cc/YX9Q-UNTS]. 
 21 See Roache et al., supra note 1, at 3; WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. 
 22 WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. Prior to the existing outbreak, there were a total of 
2387 cases and 1590 deaths. See id. 
 23 See Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Using a Tactic Unseen in a Century, Countries Cordon Off Ebola-
Racked Areas, N.Y. TIMES (Aug 12, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/13/science/using-a-
tactic-unseen-in-a-century-countries-cordon-off-ebola-racked-areas.html [http://perma.cc/9X79-
6J9V]; WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. 
 24 See Ebola Situation Report, supra note 5. 
 25 See Baize et al., supra note 12, at 1421–23; Roache et al., supra note 1, at 2–3. The source of 
this outbreak is not yet known. See Baize et al., supra note 12, at 1424. One possible explanation is 
that the outbreak stemmed from fruit bats in West Africa carrying Ebola. See id. It is suspected that 
the virus had been transmitted for months before the outbreak became apparent. See id. 
 26 See Baize et al., supra note 12, at 1422–23; Roache et al., supra note 1, at 2–3. 
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to nearby areas in Guinea in February 2014.27 Most of the transmission of Ebo-
la during this outbreak occurred among family members; after infection con-
trol mechanisms were put into place in April 2014, the transmission of Ebola 
in hospitals and during funerals decreased substantially.28 
The WHO first confirmed the outbreak on March 22, 2014; by the end of 
that month, at least one hundred people had already contracted Ebola and eighty 
people had died.29 Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone have been affected most 
severely by the outbreak, and although the number of new cases reported has 
significantly decreased and stabilized, Guinea continues to report new cases.30 
The socioeconomic consequences of the Ebola epidemic have been dev-
astating.31 The World Bank anticipates that Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone 
will experience $1.6 billion of lost economic growth in 2015.32 In Liberia, the 
economy has lost many more jobs than have been replaced—approximately 
half of Liberian households are under- or unemployed, and women have been 
hit particularly hard.33 Workers in Sierra Leone are similarly underemployed, 
and individuals with non-farming businesses have lost significant amounts of 
revenue.34 
                                                                                                                           
 27 See Baize et al., supra note 12, at 1421. 
 28 See Ousmane Faye et al., Chains of Transmission and Control of Ebola Virus Disease in Cona-
kry, Guinea in 2014: An Observational Study, 15 LANCET INFECTIOUS DISEASES 320, 323–24 (Jan. 
23, 2015), http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/laninf/PIIS1473-3099(14)71075-8.pdf [http://
perma.cc/2DP5-LCU6]; Editorial, What Worked in Controlling the Ebola Outbreak, supra note 18. 
 29 See Baize et al., supra note 12, at 1421–23; Roache et al., supra note 1, at 2–3. 
 30 See Ebola Situation Report, supra note 5; WHO Fact Sheet No. 103, supra note 1. On Septem-
ber 3, 2015, Liberia was declared Ebola-free for a second time and must undergo a three-month period 
of heightened surveillance. Ebola Transmission in Liberia Is Over; Nation Enters 90-Day Intensive 
Surveillance Period, WHO (Sept. 3, 2015), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/
2015/ebola-transmission-over-liberia/en/ [http://perma.cc/LT43-52SZ]. On November 7, 2015, the 
WHO declared that Ebola transmission ended in Sierra Leone, and Sierra Leone began a period of 
surveillance. See Ebola Situation Report, supra note 5. Guinea, however, reported a few new cases of 
Ebola at the end of October 2015. Ebola Situation Report, supra note 5. 
 31 See James G. Hodge et al., Global Emergency Legal Responses to the 2014 Ebola Outbreak: 
Public Health and the Law, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 595, 596–97 (2014); Worst-Affected Countries 
‘Crippled’ by Economic Impact of Ebola, UN NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 20, 2015), http://www.un.org/apps/
news/story.asp?NewsID=49847#.VN0JVHaodKo [http://perma.cc/6MZ7-VPAV]. 
 32 See Worst-Affected Countries ‘Crippled’ by Economic Impact of Ebola, supra note 31. In terms 
of gross domestic product, the World Bank expects Guinea to lose $540 million, Liberia to lose $180 
million, and Sierra Leone to lose $920 million. See id. 
 33 See Press Release, World Bank, Ebola Hampering Household Economies across Liberia and 
Sierra Leone (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/01/12/ebola-
hampering-household-economies-liberia-sierra-leone [http://perma.cc/6DKL-7P9D] [hereinafter Press 
Release, World Bank]. Women are particularly susceptible to being out of work because they are 
disproportionately employed in the non-farm self-employment sector, which has been impacted great-
ly. See id. Approximately 60% of women are not currently working, compared to 40% of men. Id. 
 34 See Press Release, World Bank, supra note 33. 
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The disease has also spread outside of the most affected countries.35 In July 
2014, a Liberian government official died of Ebola in Nigeria.36 Later that 
month, two U.S. aid workers were infected with Ebola while treating patients.37 
These events sparked widespread panic around the world about the cross-border 
and cross-continental spread of Ebola.38 In July 2014, the United States Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) heightened its warning level and cau-
tioned U.S. residents to abstain from non-essential travel to Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone.39 Many other organizations followed suit and withdrew their em-
ployees from the area.40 Despite pervasive fear that Ebola might become a more 
globalized epidemic, only thirty-six cases and fifteen deaths have been reported 
in countries outside Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone.41 
C. The WHO’s Responsibilities and the International Health Regulations 
The WHO was established in 1948 as a specialized agency of the UN to 
promote and protect the health of all people, with the objective of attaining the 
highest possible level of health.42 The WHO’s constitution asserts that 
“[h]ealth is the state of complete physical, mental[,] and social well-being and 
not merely the absence of disease,” and it stresses that health is a fundamental 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See Ebola Fast Facts, supra note 5; Ebola Situation Report, supra note 5. 
 36 See Liberian Doctor Dies of Ebola Virus, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2014 9:49PM ET), http://www.
wsj.com/articles/liberian-doctor-dies-of-ebola-virus-1406481862 [http://perma.cc/XU6W-YWVE]; 
Ebola Fast Facts, supra note 5. 
 37 See Liberian Doctor Dies of Ebola, supra note 36; Ebola Fast Facts, supra note 5. 
 38 See Carter Evans, Ebola Panic Spreading Much Faster Than Disease in U.S., CBS NEWS (Oct. 
18, 2014), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ebola-panic-in-us-spreading-much-faster-than-disease/ 
[http://perma.cc/893G-KJTN]; Eric Zorn, Ebola Panic More Widespread Than Disease, CHI. TRIB. 
(Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/zorn/ct-ebola-panic-kaci-hickox-
perspec-1114-20141113-column.html [http://perma.cc/V4P4-3H4R]; Ebola Fast Facts, supra note 5. 
 39 See Ebola Fast Facts, supra note 5; Press Release, Centers of Disease Control and Prevention 
[CDC], As West Africa Ebola Outbreak Worsens, CDC Issues Level 3 Travel Warning (July 31, 
2014), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/p0731-ebola.html [http://perma.cc/FB59-5WKS] 
[hereinafter Press Release, CDC]. 
 40 See, e.g., U.S. State Dep’t, Liberia Travel Warning, NEWSROOM, Jan. 21, 2015, 2015 WLNR 
2464728 (issuing travel warning advising against non-essential travel to Liberia and ordering depar-
ture of family members of State Department employees on August 7, 2014); Ebola Fast Facts, supra 
note 5 (stating that the Peace Corps removed all volunteers from Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia on 
July 30, 2014). 
 41 See Zorn, supra note 38; Ebola Situation Report, supra note 5. Eight cases and six deaths were 
reported in Mali and twenty cases and eight deaths were reported in Nigeria. Ebola Situation Report, 
supra note 5. One case was reported in Senegal. Id. The United Kingdom, Italy, and Spain each re-
ported one case of Ebola, with no deaths, and four cases have been reported in the United States, with 
one death. Id. 
 42 Constitution of the WHO, pmbl., art. 1, July 22, 1946, 14 U.N.T.S. 185; see David P. Fidler, 
Fighting the Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. 
J. 99, 110 (2004) [hereinafter Fidler, Fighting the Axis of Illness]. 
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human right critical to attaining peace and security.43 To achieve its objective, 
the WHO is tasked with coordinating authorities for international health work, 
encouraging collaboration with the UN and other organizations, providing 
technical assistance to member states, promoting research and healthcare ad-
vances, and establishing and monitoring the implementation of norms and 
standards.44 In general, the WHO has adopted a medical philosophy in which it 
views its “legislative role as neither active nor even reactive, but merely obser-
vational.”45 
Prior to the mid-1800s, states dealt with disease outbreaks domestically 
and without international cooperation.46 In 1851, the International Sanitary 
Conference was the first attempt at global governance over combating the ex-
port and import of infectious diseases.47 Consistent with the WHO’s responsi-
bilities, the International Health Regulations (IHR) were established to prevent 
domestic public health emergencies from becoming international problems.48 
The IHR are the only rules that have obtained international agreement aimed at 
controlling the cross-border spread of disease.49 
The IHR began with the adoption of the International Sanitary Regula-
tions in 1951, which sought to “ensure the maximum protection against the 
international spread of disease with minimum interference with world traf-
fic.”50 In 1969, these regulations were renamed the International Health Regu-
lations and were amended to focus on smallpox, plague, cholera, and yellow 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Constitution of the WHO, supra note 42, pmbl.; Fidler, Fighting the Axis of Illness, supra 
note 42, at 110. 
 44 See Constitution of the WHO, supra note 42, art. 2; About WHO: The Role of WHO in Public 
Health, WHO, http://www.who.int/about/role/en/  (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) [http://perma.cc/L24Y-
W7CN]. 
 45 David Bishop, Note, Lessons from SARS: Why the WHO Must Provide Greater Economic In-
centives for Countries to Comply with International Health Regulations, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1173, 
1199–1200 (2005) (quoting Allyn Lise Taylor, Making the World Health Organization Work: A Legal 
Framework for Universal Access to the Conditions for Health, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 301, 343 (1992)). 
 46 See David P. Fidler, Emerging Trends in International Law Concerning Global Infectious Dis-
ease Control, 9(3) EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 285, 285 (2003) [hereinafter Fidler, Emerging 
Trends]; Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging Infectious Diseases, supra note 12, at 777. 
 47 See Fidler, Emerging Trends, supra note 46, at 285; Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging 
Infectious Diseases, supra note 12, at 777. 
 48 See Editorial, Ebola: What Lessons for the International Health Regulations?, 384 LANCET 
1321, 1321 (2014), available at http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/PIIS0140-
6736(14)61697-4.pdf [http://perma.cc/VR8W-X2UQ] [hereinafter Editorial, What Lessons for the 
IHR?]. 
 49 See Gian Luca Burci & Jakob Quirin, Ebola, WHO, and the United Nations: Convergence of 
Global Public Health and International Peace and Security, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. INSIGHTS (Nov. 14, 
2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/volume/18/issue/25/ebola-who-and-united-nations-convergence-
global-public-health-and [http://perma.cc/SY9Y-H8UC]. 
 50 Fidler, Emerging Trends, supra note 46, at 286; see Fidler et al., Emerging and Reemerging 
Infectious Diseases, supra note 12, at 777. 
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fever.51 Following several epidemics of diseases not previously included, the 
IHR were again revised in 2005 and entered into force in 2007.52 The revised 
IHR are no longer limited to specific diseases and mark a shift away from le-
gally binding rules toward increased reliance on global information networks 
and self-reporting by states.53 
The 2005 IHR require member states to notify the WHO of events that 
may constitute a “public health emergency of international concern.”54 The 
revised IHR define a public health emergency as an event that constitutes a 
public health risk to other states through the international spread of disease that 
potentially requires a coordinated international response.55 States are also re-
quired to have an implementation plan to meet the IHR core capacity standards 
and to ensure that their health surveillance and response capacities meet func-
tional criteria.56 Specifically, states are required to meet certain minimum ca-
pacity requirements for international points of entry in order to prevent the ex-
port and import of disease.57 Although all WHO member states have agreed to 
the principles contained in the IHR, the IHR only require that states self-report 
public health events and their progress on developing core capacities.58 
                                                                                                                           
 51 Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, supra note 48. 
 52 See Fidler, Emerging Trends, supra note 46, at 286; Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, 
supra note 48. 
 53 See Fidler, Emerging Trends, supra note 46, at 286; Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, 
supra note 48. 
 54 The International Health Regulations (2005): IHR Brief No. 1, WHO, www.who.int/ihr/
publications/ihrbrief1en.pdf?ua=1 [http://perma.cc/FH3P-NPE3] [hereinafter IHR Brief No. 1]; see 
Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, supra note 48. In addition to requiring states to self-report to the 
WHO, the WHO relies on the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network to detect and respond to 
infectious disease outbreaks. See Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, supra note 48. The network 
includes both state governments and non-governmental organizations that collect information, confirm 
potential disease outbreaks, and respond to them. See Chiara Giorgetti, International Health Emer-
gencies in Failed and Failing States, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1347, 1375–76 (2013). 
 55 Giorgetti, supra note 54, at 1369; Notification and Other Reporting Requirements Under the 
IHR (2005): IHR Brief No. 2, WHO, http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/ihr_brief_no_2_en.pdf?ua=1 
[http://perma.cc/9VNR-GR5J] [hereinafter IHR Brief No. 2]. States individually determine whether a 
particular national outbreak is a “public health event” that might trigger classification as a public 
health emergency of international concern. See IHR Brief No. 2, supra. States consider four factors: 
(1) the seriousness of the event’s public health impact; (2) the unusual or unexpected nature of the 
event; (3) the risk of international disease spread; and (4) the risk that other countries will impose 
travel or trade restrictions. Id. 
 56 See IHR Brief No. 1, supra note 54. These “core capacities” include detecting events involving 
disease, assessing reported events, immediately notifying the WHO of disease events, reporting all 
essential information to the WHO, and creating and maintaining a “public health emergency contin-
gency plan.” Timothy Miano, Understanding and Applying International Infectious Disease Law: 
U.N. Regulations During an H5N1 Avian Flu Epidemic, 6 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 26, 36 
(2006). 
 57 See Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, supra note 48; IHR Brief No. 1, supra note 54. 
 58 See Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, supra note 48. 
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Additionally, the IHR provide a dispute resolution system wherein states 
first seek to settle a dispute through negotiation or other peaceful means; if that 
fails, the parties may refer the dispute to the WHO’s Director-General.59 This 
system, however, is voluntary, and no final settlement is guaranteed; as a re-
sult, it is rarely used and does not provide for realistic conflict resolution.60 
There are currently no binding mechanisms to enforce the IHR or to ensure 
their successful implementation.61 
If an event is determined to be a “public health emergency of internation-
al concern,” the Director-General of the WHO may consult with experts and 
issue temporary recommendations aimed at preventing the international spread 
of disease and avoiding interference with international trade and travel.62 As 
with the other provisions of the IHR, the Director-General’s recommendations 
are not binding.63 
D. The United Nations’ Powers Under Chapter VII 
The UNSC was established in 1946 and consists of five permanent mem-
ber states—the United States, the United Kingdom, China, France, and Rus-
sia—and ten non-permanent members elected for two-year terms.64 Under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UNSC has primary responsibility for de-
termining the existence of threats to peace and is authorized to take action in 
order to “maintain or restore international peace and security.”65 Historically, 
                                                                                                                           
 59 See Steven J. Hoffman, Making the International Health Regulations Matter: Promoting Com-
pliance Through Effective Dispute Resolution, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF GLOBAL HEALTH SE-
CURITY 239, 241 (Simon Rushton & Jeremy Youde eds., 2015). Disputes can arise when there is disa-
greement over a state’s compliance with the IHR requirements or the interpretation of an IHR provi-
sion. See id. at 240. A dispute among states may be subject to binding arbitration, but only if the states 
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 60 See id. at 242; Bishop, supra note 45, at 1193, 1218–19. The parties are legally required to 
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negotiation and mediation procedures are entirely voluntary. See Hoffman, supra note 59, at 241–42. 
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 61 See Fidler, Emerging Trends, supra note 46, at 287; Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, 
supra note 48. 
 62 IHR Brief No.1, supra note 59; see Burci & Quirin, supra note 49. 
 63 See Burci & Quirin, supra note 49. When revised in 2005, the IHR essentially replaced legally 
binding requirements with the Director-General’s ability to issue non-binding recommendations—a 
power the WHO already had before the revisions. See Fidler, Emerging Trends, supra note 46, at 288; 
Editorial, What Lessons for the IHR?, supra note 48. 
 64 See DAVID L. BOSCO, FIVE TO RULE THEM ALL: THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL AND THE MAK-
ING OF THE MODERN WORLD 3 (2009); Current Members, UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL 
[UNSC], http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7ME4-
WRBG]. 
 65 U.N. Charter art. 39; see The Security Council, UNSC, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ (last visited 
Nov. 5, 2015) [http://perma.cc/4579-9E2V]. In order to uphold this responsibility, the UNSC may act on 
behalf of UN members by issuing UNSC Resolutions. See U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. These resolutions 
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the UNSC has engaged in a broad range of diplomatic, legal, and military ac-
tivities.66 Binding UNSC Resolutions primarily have addressed issues of peace 
and security by responding to acts of aggression and the use or buildup of 
arms, authorizing military interventions and peacekeeping missions, and im-
posing sanctions.67 
Recently, the UNSC has begun to use its powers to address non-
traditional threats, marking an expansion of what it means to “maintain or re-
store international peace and security.”68 The UNSC has only once before 
treated a disease outbreak as an issue of global security: in the early 2000s, the 
UNSC used its powers to address the spread of HIV/AIDS in Africa.69 The 
UNSC held a meeting in January 2000 in which it acknowledged that 
HIV/AIDS posed a serious threat to global security, jeopardized economic 
strength, and interfered with peacekeeping efforts.70 The UNSC believed inter-
nal conflict and local violence exacerbated the spread of the disease, thereby 
endangering international peace; although it ultimately stopped short of classi-
fying HIV/AIDS as a “threat to international peace and security,” it specifically 
incorporated HIV/AIDS prevention into the mandates and training of peace-
keeping operations.71 In 2011, the UNSC reiterated the need for coordinated 
international action to minimize the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and the 
                                                                                                                           
are binding—all members of the UN “agree to carry out and accept the decisions of the Security Coun-
cil” in accordance with the UN Charter. Id. at art. 25. 
 66 See BOSCO, supra note 64, at 3. 
 67 See id. at 3–4; Anna Hood, Ebola: A Threat to the Parameters of a Threat to Peace?, 16 MELB. 
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supra, at 36.  
 68 U.N. Charter art. 39; see Kristen Boon, The UN Security Council Takes Up Ebola, OPINIO 
JURIS (Sept. 18, 2014, 4:41 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/09/18/un-security-council-takes-ebola/ 
[http://perma.cc/7846-ELNH]; Burci & Quirin, supra note 49. 
 69 See Burci & Quirin, supra note 49. See generally S.C. Res. 1308 (Jul. 17, 2000) (recognizing 
impacts of HIV/AIDS on all sectors of society and encouraging international cooperation to prevent 
the spread of disease). 
 70 See U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., 4807th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.4087 (Jan. 10, 2000). In the 
meeting, the President of the UNSC, Al Gore, stated: 
The heart of the security agenda is protecting lives, and . . . the number of people who 
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died in all of the wars in all of the decades of the twentieth century . . . . [W]hen a sin-
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Id. 
 71 Burci & Quirin, supra note 49; see S.C. Res. 1308, supra note 69, ¶¶ 1, 3; see also Joint United 
Nations Program on HIV/AIDS, ON THE FRONT LINE: A REVIEW OF PROGRAMMES THAT ADDRESS 
HIV AMONG INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPERS AND UNIFORMED SERVICES 2005–10 ii (2011), 
http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/sub_landing/files/20110519_OnTheFrontLine.pdf [http://
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importance of incorporating HIV-related awareness, training, and treatment 
into peacekeeping operations.72 
States parties to the UN may also take advantage of the principle of self-
defense so as to act in the international sphere in accordance with UN Chapter 
VII.73 Pursuant to traditional principles of international law, states are permit-
ted to use self-defense when it is necessary, the threat is immediate, and the 
response is proportionate to the threat.74 States typically are permitted to act in 
self-defense when a threat is “instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of 
means, and no moment for deliberation.”75 Because states may use self-
defense to confront traditional threats to peace like armed conflict, self-defense 
may also serve as an effective approach to confronting non-traditional threats 
to peace, such as disease.76  
II. DISCUSSION 
A. The Affected States’ Responses 
In response to the Ebola epidemic, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone—
aided by the global community—have taken many steps to contain the epidem-
ic and reduce disease incidence.77 Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone instituted 
travel bans and curfews, instructed communities on burial techniques that 
guard against the transmission of Ebola, and attempted to treat and isolate in-
fected persons.78 The affected states’ responses, however, were hampered by 
delayed assistance from international donors, systematically weak healthcare, 
                                                                                                                           
 72 See S.C. Res. 1983 (June 7, 2011). 
73 See Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual Armed Attack by Nonstate 
Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 770, 772–73, 775 (2012); Leo Van den hole, Anticipatory Self-Defense 
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1841), in BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1840–41, at 1137–38 (29th ed. 1857)). 
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Paves the Way for Future Action, GLOB. OBSERVATORY (Dec. 4, 2014), http://theglobalobservatory.
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 77 See Hodge, supra note 31, at 596; Roache et al., supra note 1, at 4–6. 
 78 See Hodge, supra note 31, at 595, 597; McNeil, supra note 23; Ebola Response Roadmap, supra 
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and poor infrastructure—particularly as years of civil war and political insta-
bility impeded the creation of functional healthcare systems.79 
Throughout the epidemic, healthcare facilities have been hot spots for the 
transmission of Ebola.80 Although even the most rudimentary healthcare facili-
ties can help isolate infected patients from the uninfected community, patients 
in poorly equipped facilities can spread the disease to healthcare workers and 
to people visiting the treatment centers.81 Healthcare workers are particularly 
susceptible to contracting Ebola from their patients because many facilities do 
not have proper protective equipment and infection controls, workers have not 
been trained appropriately, and safe and sterile units in which to isolate infect-
ed patients are in short supply.82 Additionally, symptomatic patients who are 
fearful of the disease often avoid going to hospitals for treatment, thereby 
spreading Ebola throughout the community.83 
Further exacerbating the ineffectiveness of their healthcare systems, the 
affected states generally lack the necessary human capital to successfully re-
spond to the outbreak and face a severe, pre-existing shortage of healthcare 
workers and doctors.84 Not including those who have died from the Ebola epi-
demic, Liberia and Sierra Leone had 90 and 136 doctors, respectively, to care 
for a combined population of approximately 10 million.85 Guinea has fewer 
than one thousand doctors to serve its population of approximately eleven mil-
lion.86 The spread of Ebola has taken a severe toll on these states’ already in-
adequate human capital: as of November 4, 2015, 881 health workers have 
been infected with Ebola in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, and 513 have 
died of the disease.87 As a result, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone are forced 
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 87 See Ebola Situation Report, WHO (Nov. 4, 2015), http://apps.who.int/ebola/current-situation/
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2016] The Ebola Epidemic in International Law 109 
to rely on medical professionals from other states to supplement their extreme 
shortage of healthcare workers.88 
Without strong healthcare systems capable of responding to the epidemic, 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone took steps to isolate communities and to 
contain the spread of disease, which effectively militarized the outbreak.89 
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone each declared national states of emergency, 
thereby permitting extreme measures.90 States instituted curfews, closed 
schools, restricted travel, and established community quarantines (cordon sani-
taire) to prevent anyone from leaving.91 In some states, armed troops were 
used to establish blockades and limit travel.92 As the disease spread to urban 
areas, states introduced additional quarantines and lockdowns, which, in turn, 
sparked violence and unrest.93 These extreme quarantines and lockdowns by 
the military and police generally have not been successful in reducing the 
spread of Ebola.94 Rather, these measures militarized the situation and 
“end[ed] up driving people underground and jeopardizing the trust between 
people and health providers.”95 
The imposition of states of emergency and quarantines also severely af-
fected food supplies in West Africa.96 Travel restrictions and quarantines lim-
ited the importation of food into the affected countries, and agricultural pro-
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duction has slowed as agricultural laborers continue to be unable to work be-
cause they are taking care of sick family members.97 
B. The WHO’s Response to the Ebola Epidemic 
On August 8, 2014, five months after the outbreak officially began, the 
WHO declared the Ebola epidemic to be a “public health emergency of inter-
national concern,” which triggered the WHO and IHR response mechanisms.98 
Under the IHR, an emergency committee convened to address the outbreak, 
the WHO distributed a roadmap with guidelines for controlling the epidemic, 
and the Director-General of the WHO issued temporary, non-binding recom-
mendations.99 The WHO recommended that health ministers in states with ac-
tive cases take strong leadership roles in coordinating response measures; put 
into place infection prevention mechanisms, case management tools, and 
communication strategies; and scale up activities for healthcare facilities, 
workers, and supplies.100 
Consistent with the IHR’s goal of preventing the spread of disease while 
minimizing interference with travel, the WHO recommended that states with 
active cases conduct exit screenings of all persons at international airports and 
ports, prevent the international travel of persons with Ebola or those who have 
had contact with an infected person, and isolate and restrict travel to those sus-
pected of having Ebola.101 The WHO, however, urged that there should be no 
general ban on international trade or travel.102 Such a ban would cause eco-
nomic hardship in the affected states, thereby increasing the risk of emigration 
of people from affected states and of spreading Ebola internationally.103 The 
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WHO’s temporary recommendations under the IHR remain in effect as of the 
date of this publication.104 
Despite the WHO’s non-binding recommendations and its work coordi-
nating responses with local health ministries and international organizations, 
the WHO has not been entirely effective in containing the spread of Ebola.105 
Although the WHO sent what limited resources and experts it had to the af-
fected countries, the WHO lacks the ability to forcibly mobilize health workers 
or equipment, and its response was delayed and disorganized to the detriment 
of the affected countries and other organizations.106 In addition, the WHO has 
not effectively addressed the affected states’ domestic health systems.107 The 
inadequate healthcare systems in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone constitute 
a violation of the IHR’s requirements that states develop the capacities to “de-
tect, assess, report, and respond to global health emergencies.”108 Yet because 
the IHR are not binding, there are no legal or globally enforceable conse-
quences through which the WHO can address these violations.109 
Moreover, the WHO lacks the funding to implement thoroughly a global 
response to a disease like Ebola.110 Article 44 of the IHR requires member 
states to pay dues, but those dues do not fully cover the costs of running the 
WHO.111 The WHO supplements these dues with voluntary contributions from 
other sources, but this funding scheme makes it difficult for the WHO to plan 
for the long term or to establish sufficient funding reserves.112 The WHO does 
not have funding dedicated to building durable healthcare capacities in devel-
oping countries, and high-income states obligated to provide financial and 
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technical assistance under the IHR have failed to do so.113 As a result, the 
WHO’s response to the epidemic was slow and disorganized, and it was unable 
to coerce higher-income states to assist the affected states.114 
Recognizing many of the shortcomings of the WHO’s response to the Ebo-
la epidemic, delegates from the World Health Assembly approved several ac-
tions intended to strengthen the WHO and IHR in May 2015.115 Accordingly, the 
WHO will institute an emergency program to respond to disease outbreaks swift-
ly and flexibly, and it will establish a $100 million contingency fund that can be 
tapped quickly in emergency situations.116 In addition, the World Health Assem-
bly launched a committee to review the IHR.117 Specifically, the committee will 
examine the effectiveness of the IHR in preventing and responding to the Ebola 
outbreak, the utility of the WHO’s temporary recommendations, and the viability 
of the IHR’s core capacity requirement; it will provide additional recommenda-
tions to improve the transparency, efficiency, and functionality of the IHR.118 
The review committee held its first meetings in August 2015, and the committee 
is expected to present its recommendations in May 2016.119 
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C. UN’s Response to the Ebola Epidemic 
The UNSC has dealt directly with infectious disease outbreaks only twice 
in its history: first in reaction to the spread of HIV/AIDS in the early 2000s 
and now in response to the Ebola epidemic in West Africa.120 The UNSC’s un-
precedented action marks the first time that a disease outbreak has risen to the 
level of a “threat to international peace and security,” which indicates an ex-
pansion of the UNSC’s mandate and demonstrates the increasing severity of 
cross-border public health problems and their global ripple effect.121 
On September 18, 2014, six months after the outbreak officially began, 
the UNSC passed a Resolution declaring the Ebola epidemic a “threat to inter-
national peace and security.”122 The Resolution called on UN member states to 
provide assistance to Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone; pushed states to lift 
travel restrictions that isolated the affected countries; urged the WHO to accel-
erate its response; and encouraged Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone to estab-
lish better functioning health systems.123 
In addition, the UN General Assembly created the UN Mission for Ebola 
Emergency Response (UNMEER).124 Neither a peacekeeping nor a political 
mission, UNMEER was established to provide a unified operational structure 
for UN actors to respond to the outbreak.125 UNMEER’s primary goals includ-
ed containing the spread of disease through case management and safe burial 
services, treating infected patients, ensuring that essential services were pro-
vided to affected communities, and generally preventing the spread of Ebo-
la.126 On July 31, 2015, UNMEER ended its operations and transferred its 
functions to the WHO because it had “achieved its core objective of scaling up 
the response on the ground and establishing unity of purpose among respond-
ers . . . .”127  
Although the UNSC’s Resolutions were an unprecedented attempt to 
combat the spread of disease, the UN’s response was delayed and did not spark 
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as significant a global reaction as was necessary to eliminate the spread of 
Ebola.128 
III. ANALYSIS 
In an era of globalization, the transmission of a disease like Ebola is truly 
an international problem.129 As the spread of Ebola from Guinea to Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, and the rest of the world has shown, diseases spread easily 
across state borders as people travel and engage in trade.130 It is also evident 
that Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone do not have adequate resources and in-
frastructure to contain the outbreak.131 Epidemics like Ebola clearly demon-
strate that “microbes do not recognize borders . . . .”132 Instead, Ebola acts like 
a “nonstate actor[] with transnational power,” defying the political boundaries 
of sovereign states.133 Individual states, acting alone, cannot protect people 
from the spread of infectious diseases.134 Current non-binding international 
recommendations and resolutions, such as the IHR and Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, merely “allow[] ideas to exist under the guise of law, without bite.”135 
As a result, collective international action bolstered by strong enforcement 
mechanisms is needed to address the global spread of disease.136 
Instead of the current non-binding tools, the IHR should be made binding 
on states and strengthened with mandatory enforcement capabilities and great-
er incentives for compliance.137 The WHO should be given more funding, and 
it should be reorganized to respond to disease outbreaks more effectively and 
to facilitate the adoption of long-term health solutions in developing coun-
tries.138 Lastly, states should acknowledge that diseases such as Ebola can be 
as dangerous as other threats to global security; thus, states should use the 
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principles of war under Chapter VII to guide their response to this non-
traditional threat to international peace and security.139 
A. Improving the Effectiveness of the IHR’s and WHO’s Capacity to 
Respond to the Ebola Epidemic 
In order to combat the spread of Ebola, the currently non-binding mecha-
nisms of the IHR and WHO need to be strengthened and made binding on 
member states.140 Given the interconnectedness of the IHR and WHO, both 
must be improved in tandem because changing one without the other will have 
only a limited effect on the cross-border spread of disease.141 
1. Strengthening the International Health Regulations 
When revised in 2005 to more broadly address global health crises, the 
IHR shifted away from being a binding legal mechanism and moved toward 
establishing non-binding global information networks and self-reporting re-
quirements.142 For example, the IHR require that states monitor and report po-
tential disease outbreaks and that states have strong domestic healthcare sys-
tems.143 In response to the current Ebola outbreak, the WHO issued temporary, 
non-binding recommendations to guide states in their response to the epidem-
ic.144 These self-reporting requirements and temporary recommendations, 
however, have not been implemented effectively, resulting in a gap between 
states’ individual responses and the global community’s response.145 Many 
states do not have the research, workforce, or surveillance capabilities required 
under the IHR.146 In fact, as of 2013, no African state had fully implemented 
the IHR’s core capacity requirements, even though forty-three of the forty-six 
African states had performed assessments of their required core capacities.147 
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A major obstacle to the proper implementation of the IHR is a lack of 
funding.148 Although the IHR require that states provide financial resources 
and support to develop and maintain strong domestic health systems, devel-
oped countries largely have failed to comply with the requirement that they 
assist other states, and the WHO currently does not have funding dedicated to 
building strong domestic health systems.149 As will be discussed in Part 
III.A.2, increasing the WHO’s funding and requiring states to contribute to a 
capacity-building fund would help to implement the IHR more effectively.150 
In order to be a more operative tool in combating epidemics such as Ebo-
la, the IHR also need to include stronger enforcement mechanisms for when 
states fail to react, act inappropriately, or otherwise do not meet the IHR’s ca-
pacity-building requirements.151 At present, the IHR do not include any man-
datory enforcement capabilities, meaning that states that have fallen below the 
core capacity requirements have neither the opportunity nor the incentive to 
meet these unenforceable standards.152 In fact, a Review Committee estab-
lished by the WHO to evaluate the IHR after the H1N1 flu pandemic in 2009 
concluded that one of the “most important structural shortcomings of the IHR 
is the lack of enforceable sanctions” and other enforcement mechanisms.153 
The IHR include “soft” mechanisms to encourage compliance such as re-
lying on peer pressure from other member states and a dispute resolution sys-
tem, but neither functions as a mandatory or binding requirement.154 Without 
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enforcement tools, states’ obligations to report epidemics quickly, develop na-
tional capacities, and assist other states are easily shirked.155 Moreover, with-
out any binding mechanism to compel compliance, politics rather than law will 
determine the resolution of disputes.156 
One possible enforcement solution is a more detailed dispute resolution 
procedure with a codified list of IHR violations so that states can be more 
aware of what constitutes an enforceable violation.157 Once the IHR have been 
clarified, the dispute resolution system could be improved to guarantee that 
disputes are actually resolved and that the system is utilized more effective-
ly.158 The IHR could establish an advisory entity to help states reach mutually 
agreeable resolutions.159 For example, states could seek advice from an inde-
pendent legal expert about issues of IHR interpretation, or states could submit 
their disputes to a compulsory mediation organization, complete with profes-
sional, trained mediators.160 
To encourage states to meet the core capacity standards under the IHR, a 
supervisory committee of experts could be established to oversee states’ pro-
gress toward implementing the requirements.161 If a state falls behind or vio-
lates the IHR, the committee could make recommendations to assist the state in 
meeting the requirements or impose negative consequences.162 Some academ-
ics suggest that sanctions by individual states could be used to ensure compli-
ance: states would be permitted to impose sanctions or trade restrictions to 
pressure other states that have violated the IHR or have not met their IHR ob-
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ligations.163 Although sanctions may have some effect on compliance in the 
long run, they are not an appropriate tool to respond to disease epidemics such 
as Ebola.164 If the international community imposed sanctions on an affected 
state, the state would suffer double economic harm: the economic consequenc-
es of the sanctions as well as the socioeconomic consequences of an Ebola ep-
idemic that reduces workforce productivity, foreign investment, and gross do-
mestic product.165 This double harm would further hinder the state’s ability to 
respond to and recover from a disease epidemic.166 Accordingly, sanctions 
should not be relied upon to force states’ compliance with the IHR.167 
In addition to providing enforcement mechanisms, the IHR must provide 
more incentives for states to comply voluntarily.168 States parties to the IHR 
are much more apt to comply with the IHR when the advantages of compliance 
far outweigh the advantages of noncompliance.169 The WHO should consider 
providing affirmative economic incentives for states that comply with the 
IHR—as opposed to negative economic sanctions for noncompliance.170 For 
example, a compensation fund could be established to help reimburse affected 
states for property damaged due to a disease outbreak.171 The fund could be 
created subject to a corresponding repayment program so that affected states 
repay the money loaned to them.172 Another option could be to establish a fund 
to compensate individuals quarantined during a disease outbreak for lost in-
come.173 Such a fund, however, would likely be very expensive to establish 
and administer.174 Given how broadly the quarantines were instituted in parts 
of Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone and how difficult it would be to measure 
lost income among the affected population, this option, in all likelihood, is not 
viable.175 
The WHO should also provide greater incentives and assistance for im-
provements to domestic disease surveillance mechanisms, particularly for 
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states like Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone that lack resources.176 Developed 
countries must assist developing countries with establishing and implementing 
domestic capacities, particularly by sharing technologies and providing fund-
ing.177 One way to incentivize developed countries to contribute money to de-
veloping nations is to ensure that the developed countries receive a return on 
their investment.178 Although spending money on health issues is expensive for 
any state, one unit of health expenditure in a developing state like Guinea, Li-
beria, or Sierra Leone will generate a disproportionately higher level of suc-
cess than such an expenditure in a developed country because developing 
states have such a low public health baseline.179 Moreover, experts in interna-
tional health have shown that money spent for “promotive, protective, and 
primary care services” in developing states leads to large improvements in 
public health measures and can generate benefits for other states, such as con-
taining disease to a small region.180 
The IHR also could make the receipt of certain funding conditional upon 
developing states’ meeting certain benchmarks in improving their disease sur-
veillance and public health systems.181 Thus, developed states would receive 
results from their spending and developing states would have reason to make 
reforms in order to receive funding.182 This incentive, however, should be used 
sparingly—only limited amounts of funding should be conditioned upon 
states’ performance because developing states rely heavily on outside funding 
to achieve health goals.183 Moreover, conditional funding would not be appro-
priate during an active disease epidemic such as Ebola due to the need for 
funding that can be rapidly mobilized to affected states.184 
Finally, the monitoring and self-reporting requirements under the IHR need 
to be modified to encourage compliance by the international community.185 In-
stead of unreliable self-reporting, the IHR should require the independent moni-
toring of states’ implementation of the IHR.186 An outside non-governmental 
organization could be established to survey and monitor member states’ progress 
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in meeting the IHR standards and then report that progress to the WHO.187 If a 
state fails to meet the IHR requirements based on these assessments, then more 
formalized enforcement mechanisms could be initiated.188 
2. Strengthening the World Health Organization 
At present, surveillance and detection of potential health crises is a purely 
domestic problem.189 As one academic has noted, “no matter what the [WHO] 
mandates, it will always be limited by the sovereignty of its member states.”190 
The WHO, for example, is not able to assist a state in responding to an infec-
tious disease epidemic unless the state invites the WHO to provide such assis-
tance.191 The WHO should be restructured and given greater resources so that 
it is more readily able to intervene when disease breaks out.192 
First and foremost, the WHO needs to be given a larger and more flexible 
budget.193 Currently, the WHO’s budget consists of assessed contributions 
from member states as well as voluntary contributions.194 Its reliance on volun-
tary contributions, however, limits the WHO’s autonomy, particularly given 
that “the amount of funding allocated to the WHO serves as a measure of the 
degree of confidence donors have in the Organization and a gauge of the 
WHO’s performance and credibility in the world.”195 If donors are not feeling 
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particularly confident, the WHO suffers and is unable to plan its expenditures 
consistently.196 
The WHO should increase the dues from member states—despite their 
consistent resistance—so that it can implement its programs regularly, make 
long-term plans, and avoid leaving affected states without recourse due to 
budgetary constraints.197 The Ebola epidemic has exposed the systemic vulner-
abilities in West Africa; WHO member states must acknowledge the organiza-
tion’s need for increased funding to respond to such epidemics.198 The trans-
mission of Ebola from Africa to Europe and the United States has also demon-
strated that the risk of the international spread of disease is very high.199 De-
veloped states can protect themselves by assisting developing states in re-
sponding to the epidemic and by providing further funding.200 In addition to 
the incentives identified above, the WHO may be able to attract more funding 
from donor states by consolidating its organization and operations and by 
spending money in a more cost-efficient manner.201 The WHO could stream-
line its operations and its bureaucracy to reduce overhead costs or partner with 
other technical organizations to allocate responsibilities more efficiently.202 In 
the long run, the WHO should focus its spending on capacity building, disease 
surveillance, and sanitation efforts to prevent disease epidemics before they 
occur.203 
In addition to increasing its budget, the WHO should broaden its mission 
to encompass more proactive intervention into public health emergencies.204 
The WHO, as a specialized agency of the UN, claims that it is not intended to 
be the “first responder” in health emergencies, but rather that it acts in an ob-
servational capacity.205 But if the affected states are too weak to respond to 
disease outbreaks and the WHO does not act as a first responder, then there 
will be a significant delay in the international community’s ability to react to 
disease epidemics.206 Instead of limiting itself to being an observer, the WHO 
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should revise its mandate so that it can respond more quickly and take preven-
tative action: “Instead of doing the job of governments, it should focus on the 
things [governments] cannot manage alone, such as helping poor countries set 
up health systems, disseminating the best medical research and policies, and 
combating global epidemics.”207 Once the WHO has been backed by strong 
enforcement mechanisms, given greater funding, and reinvigorated with a 
modified mandate, politics can largely be left out of the international commu-
nity’s response to global disease epidemics.208 
B. Responding to Ebola Under the UN’s Chapter VII Powers 
As the UNSC acknowledged in its September 2014 Resolution, the Ebola 
epidemic poses a serious threat to international peace and security, and there-
fore, the international community should respond to the epidemic as such a 
threat.209 
The impacts of the Ebola epidemic are as dangerous as an act of aggres-
sion by a state actor: “Statistically, disease is a more formidable killer than 
war, with the power to completely destabilize governments.”210 Like war, dis-
ease epidemics reduce workforce capacity and productivity, threaten food se-
curity, erode government legitimacy, and create power vacuums that allow oth-
er states to take over control or territory.211 Moreover, disease epidemics can 
impede economic growth by reducing life expectancy, removing productive 
individuals from the workforce, imposing costs of prevention and treatment, 
and negatively impacting investments in a state’s businesses and infrastruc-
ture.212 As discussed in Parts I.B. and II.A., even though the health situation 
has improved significantly in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone during 2015, 
the socioeconomic consequences of the Ebola epidemic have been devastat-
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ing.213 The combination of economic stagnation, restricted trade and travel, 
and a depleted workforce have destabilized the region and jeopardized its re-
covery, much like in a war zone.214 As a result, the global community should 
respond to Ebola in a manner similar to the way in which it responds to acts of 
aggression by state actors or other non-traditional threats to peace and securi-
ty.215 As states respond swiftly and strongly to threats of war, the international 
community should respond to threats from infectious diseases at an early stage 
by notifying the WHO quickly, seeking the assistance of other states, and re-
sponding effectively to domestic conditions.216 
States should be guided by the principles of self-defense when responding 
to the Ebola epidemic.217 Self-defense is typically permitted when action is 
necessary and proportional to the threat at hand.218 The global community 
should utilize this standard as a benchmark to determine when global action is 
required to intervene in a global health crisis.219 To determine whether action is 
necessary, states could utilize the monitoring and information collection sys-
tems already established by the WHO and adopt an early-warning system.220 
Using the information collected by the WHO and other non-governmental or-
ganizations, the affected states would be able to take action or seek assistance 
from others at an earlier stage.221 In effect, this would be analogous to permit-
ting states to use force preemptively to respond to potential security threats.222 
Though the use of force preemptively is not always a widely accepted form of 
self-defense, a preventative response to a potential disease outbreak—if im-
plemented properly—could positively impact disease containment and access 
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to emergency healthcare equipment and facilities while avoiding the negative 
consequences of a delayed response.223 
As states’ self-defense measures in reaction to traditional security threats 
must be proportional, so too must states’ responses to disease outbreaks.224 
Preemptive responses should be focused on triggering the IHR’s mechanisms 
early and on efficiently mobilizing resources, manpower, equipment, and 
knowledge.225 Treating a disease outbreak like a security problem and respond-
ing to it like an act of war, however, creates a risk of militarizing a disease out-
break; this in turn instills fear, deters symptomatic individuals from seeking 
treatment, and has damaging socioeconomic consequences.226 As a result, 
states should avoid harsh responses such as instituting lockdowns, travel bans, 
or strict quarantines.227 To avoid militarizing the Ebola epidemic, this “war” 
should be fought primarily by those states and organizations with medical ex-
pertise and experience in combating disease epidemics, rather than military 
forces.228  
Moreover, states should act in collective self-defense in responding to fu-
ture epidemics.229 In general, the international community approves the use of 
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collective self-defense in two scenarios: when a state is a member of an estab-
lished collective defense alliance, or when a state requests that another state 
intervene on its behalf.230 Similar mechanisms could be established for states 
to respond to disease outbreaks like Ebola.231 States could come together in 
advance agreements to assist one another in responding to disease outbreaks.232 
Much like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), states could treat a 
disease threat to one state as a disease threat to all member states, thereby re-
quiring rapid intervention by other member states.233 Such advance agreements 
to combat disease epidemics should require states to assist an affected state, in 
contrast to the current systems that are unable to compel action even when as-
sistance has been requested.234 Furthermore, similar to what has occurred in 
the current Ebola epidemic, an affected state may make a formal request for 
assistance, which would permit other states to intervene on the affected state’s 
behalf and take any measures necessary and proportionate to the disease 
threat.235 
In the same way that states safeguard against armed attacks by maintain-
ing critical infrastructure and stockpiling equipment, states should similarly 
shore up their domestic defenses against diseases like Ebola and receive assis-
tance to build up domestic health capacities.236 One way to accomplish this 
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goal is for the UNSC to implement an early warning system to detect potential 
health and security situations and to spur early action.237 A special adviser 
could be established to collect information, assess potentially dangerous situa-
tions, and bring them to the attention of the UN Secretary-General, who then 
would make recommendations to member states.238 Such a system at the UN 
would complement and give strength to the WHO’s disease-tracking systems 
that are already in place but currently unable to formally recommend that the 
UNSC take action on a particular issue.239 
Although self-defense and the UNSC’s powers may be potent tools to 
mobilize international health interventions and to prevent widespread socioec-
onomic devastation, these tools are limited by the fact that they are not aimed 
at controlling disease, but rather at a traditional state aggressor.240 First, there 
are no easily identifiable targets toward which states can direct action—
“enforcement action in this case cannot be directed against particular ‘targets,’ 
and the practical value of enforcement actions squarely placed under Chapter 
VII seems questionable.”241 
Second, the traditional tools that states often use to respond to a threat to 
international peace and security would be less effective in the context of a dis-
ease outbreak.242 When attempting to stave off an act of aggression by a state 
actor, states acting in accordance with UN Chapter VII may impose sanctions 
on a state; use force against another state, if authorized; send in peacekeeping 
troops; or take other measures.243 These measures, however, would not be en-
tirely effective against Ebola.244 For example, sending troops into a health cri-
sis may worsen the situation on the ground and spread fear among the popula-
tion.245 Although sanctions may encourage states to comply with international 
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law, imposing sanctions alone likely would not contain the spread of Ebola and 
may lead to negative socioeconomic consequences.246 
Ultimately, to effectively fight Ebola like a war, states must balance the 
need to respond to disease threats swiftly and proportionately and to maintain 
readiness to defend against such “attacks” with the need to avoid reacting too 
strongly through use of extreme measures or brute force that create fear and 
isolate the affected states.247 
CONCLUSION 
The Ebola epidemic began in Guinea in March 2014 and spread quickly 
to Liberia, Sierra Leone, and across the globe. After more than a year, the epi-
demic has taken the lives of more than 11,000 people, and more deaths are 
likely to occur before the epidemic is fully contained. Guinea, Liberia, and 
Sierra Leone have been affected severely because chronic poverty has impeded 
the development of robust health systems, the states have recently emerged 
from long periods of civil war and instability, there is an extreme dearth of 
experienced healthcare workers and medical infrastructure, and rampant dis-
trust of government has kept populations in fear. The socioeconomic conse-
quences for the affected states have been overwhelming: the epidemic has re-
duced workforce productivity; interfered with trade, travel, and investment; 
and impeded economic growth. 
In response to the epidemic, Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone instituted 
quarantines and states of emergency, but these efforts were not fully effective. 
Their responses have been hindered by the states’ systematically weak 
healthcare systems and a drastic shortage of equipment. Consequently, interna-
tional organizations and individual states stepped in to assist. The WHO de-
clared the epidemic to be a public health emergency of international concern 
and made recommendations under the IHR. These IHR mechanisms, however, 
are not mandatory and have often been undermined by the WHO’s limited 
funding. In addition, the UN declared the Ebola epidemic to be a threat to in-
ternational peace and security and established an emergency response mission 
for West Africa. 
Although the responses of the WHO and UN were important steps to 
combat the spread of Ebola, additional and more rapid collective action—
supported by strong enforcement capabilities and adequate funding—is needed 
to effectively address the global spread of disease. The IHR should be backed 
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by mandatory enforcement mechanisms that incentivize compliance with IHR 
requirements and lead to the guaranteed resolution of disputes. The IHR also 
should encourage developed countries to assist developing countries in main-
taining domestic healthcare capacities and allow for third-party observers to 
ensure that states meet the IHR’s core capacity requirements. The WHO should 
be strengthened by allowing it to more readily intervene on behalf of states and 
by giving it a more active role in fighting the global spread of disease. To do 
so, the WHO will need a larger and more flexible budget with special funds 
established for emergency responses and developing domestic healthcare sys-
tems. 
Since 2014, the effects of the Ebola epidemic have been as destabilizing 
as a war, prompting the UN Security Council to declare Ebola a threat to peace 
and security. Just as states respond swiftly and strongly to threats of war, the 
international community should respond swiftly and strongly to threats from 
infectious diseases like Ebola. States’ responses should be guided by principles 
of self-defense and the guidelines of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. In addi-
tion, states should act in collective self-defense against disease threats and 
maintain operational readiness to confront future disease epidemics without 
over-militarizing the situation on the ground. 
